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Introduction
European Works Councils (EWCs) are now an established part of
industrial relations structures in approaching 600 multinational
companies with potentially 10,000 or more employee participants
(EIRR 2000). They have become the object of considerable
expectation as, variously, vehicles for the development of a
European industrial relations system, corporate communication
networks or the basis for international trade union solidarity. They
are equally the focus of wide ranging academic speculation, case
study analysis and survey research. The empirical data that has
been generated has served to support the development of a series
of ‘models’ of EWCs that are commonly related to the initial
expectations to their role.
The argument of this paper is that there is a need for conceptual
clarity in the analysis of EWCs that challenges survey analysis that
treats them as equivalents or case studies that seek to generalise
from, for example, a particular sector or pattern of national
ownership. The first part of the paper, therefore, reviews different
‘models’ of EWCs and suggests that corporate structure has been
a neglected feature of analysis but is central to assessing the
‘expectations’ of what EWCs might achieve. The second part of
the paper draws from a survey of EWCs in the North East of
England as the basis for an analysis that locates them within a
‘global outpost’.
Great Expectations
The long struggle over the introduction of employee participation
systems in large multinational corporations is bound together by
four inter-related factors. The first two concern the perceived
power of multinational companies in relation to national States and
their ability to control an economic power that has political
consequences. The second two factors concern the institutional
process shaping the development of the European Works Council
Directive and the respective role of employers and trade unions.
3The first of these factors focuses on the investment strategies of
multinational companies and their power to shift employment
between national States and encourage a ‘race to the bottom’ in
terms of labour costs. The early draft Directives in the 1970s and
1980s corresponded with attempts by the OECD and national and
international trade union organisations to attempt to control
multinational capital (Levinson 1972). At the heart of the
Commission’s institutional strategy at this time were proposals to
‘roll out’ a system of co-determination that put workers on the
boards of management. A resurgence of interest in the power of
multinational corporations coincided with a restructuring of the
European economy and the influence of Japanese companies on
the development of human resource management practice (Eaton
2000).
The argument at the centre of the response to the power of
multinationals was that, to use a phrase from elsewhere in
European Union discussions, there was a ‘democratic deficit’. It is
this second factor that underpins the development European Union
policy. It coincides with a core argument for the development of the
social dialogue between the workers and employers as part of a
social dimension necessary to balance the opportunities for
business development driven by the Single European Market. A
framework of rights were to be developed from the Social Charter
to prevent social dumping and workers were to be given
consultation rights that were to focus particularly on organisational
restructuring. In effect the power of multinational companies was to
be tackled from two directions. Through European-wide standards
in areas such as health and safety and employment rights and via
workers influence over corporate decision-making.
The next two factors concern the actual shaping of policy once it
was clear that the political will existed in the remaining member
States following the UK opt out of social policy. In this respect, the
third factor in policy development was the role of the European
trade unions. The European Trades Union Confederation (ETUC)
was created in its current form in 1973 and provided the agency for
consistent pressure for action on the Commission (Gabaglio &
Hoffmann 1998). As we have suggested, the unions were pushing
at an open door in the Commission and financial support and
encouragement was available for pilot European Works Council
projects from 1991 onwards (Turner 1996). The development of
European collective bargaining is an equally longstanding, if more
4controversial, project but one in which there might be expectations
of the role that EWCs could play. (Gobin 1994, Stirling 1994).
The final factor is the resistance of employers to the introduction of
any set of institutional procedures that would restrict their freedom
to manage their corporate employee relations strategies. This has
led to increasingly voluntaristic proposals from the Commission
and what Cressy (1993) describes as ‘optionalisation’, where rigid
formats based on particular national systems have been
abandoned in favour of flexibility.
The interaction of these four factors finally led to the production of
the Directive leading to the establishment of EWCs that, as a
political compromise, inevitably failed to fulfil the more radical
expectations. Trade unions and employers were faced with a
largely voluntarist approach which left them to fill the vacuum with
practice that fitted their particular organisational circumstances.
Thus, the agreements that have been signed share similarities in
relation to issues such as representation, meetings and terms of
references but practice might be quite different between
companies. In particular, the expectations and understandings of
what can be achieved through ‘consultation’ and the clarification of
‘transnational’ issues remains the subject of considerable debate.
Developing State Models
Given the diversity of expectations and the flexibility in the
Directive it is likely that different conceptual models of EWCs
would emerge and this is precisely the case. These models have
commonly related EWCs to national and European industrial
relations systems but this neglects the significance of EWCs as
areas of ‘contested terrain’ that has been opened up by the
voluntarist nature of the Directive. Industrial relations are shaped
by the actors in the system and it is national States that have
provided the focus of attention in generating models of European
Works Councils. In what follows, we will review the role of the
European and national States in the development of EWCs but our
particular focus is on the critical role of corporate management and
how that constrains the responses of employee representatives.
We have already argued that the European Works Council
Directive was a political compromise that left considerable room for
voluntary agreement. This is not to say that the key features of the
5Directive did not provide a foundation for the subsequent
development of agreements. It is clear that questions of
representation, frequency of meetings and the terms of reference
of EWCs have been shaped by the Directive’s subsidiary
requirements. This is not unsurprising given that they provide a
readily available model that is flexible enough for local
interpretation and that trade union negotiators seeking agreements
are unlikely to reach settlements below what they will consider to
be minimum standards.
The national State can also shape the development of EWCs
through the transposition of the Directive within a pre-existing
industrial relations framework. Indeed, the Directive itself leaves
scope for the election or appointment of European Works Council
members according to regulations established in national States.
Transposition has led to the shaping of the Directive to meet
national traditions in relation to employee participation and some
marked differences derive from this (Blanke 1999). These
particularly relate to different approaches to national works council
systems (or the lack of them) between countries. Thus, for
example, Blanke notes the significance of differences in the
transposition between countries such as France where national
works councils are joint committees and in the Nordic countries
where trade union organisations dominate employee
representation.
The relationship between EWCs and national industrial relations
systems has been regarded as critical for their development.
Lecher and Rub argue that
‘at the moment of its establishment the European Works Council is
initially a body cut loose from national structures of representation.
The process of the constitution of the European Works Council
must them also be a process through which the national and
European levels of representation are integrated and intermeshed’
(1999: 11)
However, there is an equally strong argument that EWCs are tied
by an umbilical cord to the employee representation system in the
country that gave them birth. For example, Knudsen and Bruun’s
analysis of agreements in the Nordic countries found that, with
some exceptions in Denmark, they followed national models of
employee participation. That this is an expectation and that it is
6commonly fulfilled is perhaps unsurprising given that agreements
are concluded within the framework of law established by a
particular national State which is likely to be the ‘home’ country of
the multinational company. If its major employment base remains
in that country then employee representation may be dominated by
delegates who share the same approach to employee relations as
corporate management. This may be reinforced by language
barriers and cultural differences between minority delegations
which isolates them, leaving the European Works Council to act as
an extension of national systems in the way that Streeck (1997)
has suggested.
Developing Corporate Models
Corporate human resource strategies can also reflect national
business systems and industrial relations models thus, as
Marginson has argued in relation to the purported ‘eurocompany’:
‘there is little evidence amongst large enterprises of convergence
on a single type … European enterprises remain a collection of
differing national enterprises’ (2000: 17)
Hence we might expect national companies to use national
industrial relations models and for these to permeate EWCs.
However, this argument is certainly not decisive, with alternative
approaches suggesting that corporate cultures might diffuse best
practice (Martin & Beaumont 1998) and that they might also be
influenced by ‘reverse diffusion’ (Edwards 1998). In developing this
argument in relation to EWCs, Marginson also notes a ‘sector
effect’ that he attributes to the influence of the policy of European
Industry Federations on agreements. We might quibble that the
term ‘sector effect’ is misleading in that Marginson does not
appear to be arguing that it is the economic sector itself that has
the effect but rather the particular European Industry Federation.
Nevertheless, he also notes the significance of corporate policy
and the significance of different types of multinational companies
for EWCs. However, analysis in this respect has been limited
although we would argue that it is critical for understanding EWCs
and for expectations of how they might be organised and what
they might achieve.
We might expect the operation of EWCs to be affected by three
factors: corporate structure, corporate decision-making strategy
7and corporate communications policy. The three are clearly inter-
related but it is useful to think about them as analytically distinct. In
this respect, the distinctions developed by Heenan and Perlmutter
(1979) between ethnocentric, polycentric and geocentric
multinational companies are now familiar. As dynamic
organisations, multinational companies may shift between
categories depending on how they grow. For example, a company
might start a business in its own country and grow by building new
plant abroad that sticks with the core business. In expanding it
might be able to choose a polycentric or geocentric strategy.
Another company may grow through mergers and acquisitions but
stick to a core business and be polycentric and so on. This point is
a straightforward one but corporate change could have a profound
affect on the European Works Council as companies shifted from
one to the other, even if the process is likely to be a gradual one. It
is also necessary to develop an analysis that relates these
categories to single and multi-product MNCs and further relate
them to organisational ‘branch plants’. In doing so me would then
develop an approach that suggests there will be different
expectations of EWCs as between, for example, an ethnocentric
UK-based multinational company compared to a geocentric multi-
product non-UK company (we develop this argument below).
Corporate decision-making strategy is the second critical element
in evaluating expectations for the role of EWCs. Decision-making
might be expected to follow from corporate structure and the
ethnocentric, polycentric, and geocentric categories clearly imply
that decisions are made differently in each type of organisation.
What follows from this is the need to expand the categories to
raise the issue of centralised and decentralised decision-making.
This might raise question of ‘tight-loose’ management strategies
implying a tight financial hold from the centre but loose
‘supervision’ of day to day management. Richbell & Watts’ analysis
of corporate decision making in relation to plant closures illustrates
how different strategies could circumscribe the role of EWCs.
‘In Kellog, the European plants are controlled from a European
headquarters which allocates production to specific sites … In
Unilever … local subsidiaries are expected to compete with each
other for shares of European production’ (2000: 81)
Stoop (1999) has developed a similar analysis in suggesting that
the role of EWCs will be determined by the degree of integration
8and differentiation between plants in a multinational company.
Differentiation indicates the extent to which plants produce the
same or similar goods and services and integration refers to the
amount of autonomy that subsidiaries have to run the local
business. What follows from this has, again, profound implications
for the role of EWCs and the expectations of participants. Clearly,
highly differentiated and unintegrated companies will provide
difficulties in producing ‘common ground’ for employee works
councillors and limited scope for transnational co-operation.
Corporate communications policy will also affect approaches by
multinational companies to EWCs. Fourboul & Bournois (1999)
suggest models of company communications that relate to
corporate organisation and which further develop the ethnocentric,
polycentric and geocentric approaches. Communication of
corporate decision needs to be understood in relation to other
managers, workers organisations (trade unions or local Works
Councils) and employees in general. Policies in this area will also
derive from corporate structure; for example, if a company is
polycentric we might expect communications with employees to be
the responsibility of the host-country management. Both these
points are relevant in relation to EWCs. Firstly, they are an
imposed communication system that few companies have chosen
in principle (although they can negotiate the form). That provides a
challenge to their existing management communication structures,
as there is a potential that workers who are European Works
Council members will have greater access to information than local
managers. Secondly, they are at least potentially, a form of upward
communication and Fourboul & Bournois (1999: 213) are strongly
critical of this process in their case study companies. However,
there are likely to be differences in terms of company culture (as
well as structure) and this, to return to the earlier argument, can be
shaped by national industrial relations systems.
Corporate Models and the European Works Council
Following from these arguments regarding corporate structure and
strategies it is necessary to relate them to the operation of EWCs
and the expectations of employee representatives. A two fold
model can be developed which will illustrate the significance of
EWCs for delegates such as those in our research who are
distanced from corporate decision making.
9The first stage in building a model of EWCs is to adopt the
characteristics of multinational companies suggested above by
Heenan and Perlmutter and Stoop (see table one).
Table One: Corporate Models
Geocentric Ethnocentric
Integrated Autonomous
Low differentiation High differentiation
The table illustrates the two ends of a spectrum in which, for
example, polycentric companies may fit with high levels of
autonomy but lower levels of differentiation. Dynamic organisations
such as companies do not accommodate themselves easily into
analytical ‘types’ but they can be utilised to help explain action. In
this case, the approach of management and employees to EWCs.
This can be illustrated by a further development of the model as
shown in table two.
Table Two: Models of European Works Councils
EMPLOYEE MEMBERSHIP
managers employee
representatives
trade unionists
NATIONAL COMPOSITION
single country
dominant
Dominant groups No dominant groups
(European)
IDEOLOGY
managerial consensual adversarial
EXPECTATIONS
information consultation bargaining
As with the first stage of the model’s development the table
illustrates different ends of a spectrum into which EWCs might fit.
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Membership refers to the employee composition of the European
Works Council. The involvement of managers is not necessarily a
matter for EWCs to choose as they may be elected through
national systems for appointing European Works Council
representatives. However, the presence of significant numbers of
managers who are not trade union representatives will impact on
the internal dynamics of the EWCs particularly where national
trade union delegates are unused to working with managers ‘on
the same side of the table’. The ‘middle category’ of employee
representatives provides for the potential of a heterogeneous
works council with no necessary commonality between individuals
with different constituencies and potentially different expectations
of the European Works Council. Trade union representation
provides the opportunity for the most coherence in the works
council but there is no necessary assumption that even national
trade union delegations will share the same views and this is
compounded at the European level.
The question of national domination takes us back to the earlier
arguments regarding the extension of national industrial relations
systems into EWCs. It also raises issues in relation to the
operation of European Works Council meetings themselves. The
domination of a particular national group with a close association
with ‘their’ management may leave other representatives isolated
and with little commitment to the European Works Council. This
may also happen to small groups or individuals where a number of
national groups dominate. This can encourage competition
between dominant groups where they fail to secure agreement on
a joint approach to the European Works Council. For example,
divisions may be generated by competitive bidding in the case of
potential plant closures. In works councils with no dominant groups
there is ambiguity over their development with the possibility of
moving towards what Miller (1999) has described as a genuinely
‘European’ works council or, alternatively the works council may
simply fragment and offer little opportunity for development.
The question of ‘ideology’ is complex and a reflection of national
industrial relations systems and the approach to the works council
of both management and employee representatives, particularly
where a trade union is involved. In the period of development of
EWCs following the introduction of the Directive, proactive
employers took the opportunity of this period of voluntarism to
shape works councils to reflect a human resource management
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ideology. Effectively, they sought to incorporate EWCs into existing
corporate communications policies. At the opposite end of the
spectrum might be EWCs dominated by trade union representation
that reflects national, adversarial, industrial relations systems in
which EWCs become another forum for challenging management
decisions.
We have already argued that there is an important relationship
between the expectations of employee representatives and the
constraints of corporate structure. In table two we suggest that
there might be expectations that reflect the views of both
management and employees and that these may not coincide.
There is a clear range in expectations from EWCs being simply
‘information givers’ to them having a bargaining role. Each of the
categories of information, consultation and bargaining has
national, cultural understandings of the terms that can lead to
misunderstandings in themselves. In addition the concepts are
fluid, with one slipping into the other during the process of
‘discussions’. Finally, and particularly in relation to bargaining,
there may be strong and divergent policy views about the role of
the European Works Council.
In summary, it is clear that EWCs cannot be treated as
homogeneous entities and that corporate structures and company
policies have a major influence on their development. In this
respect European Works Councillors operating in a branch plant
economy in the North East of England may have little opportunity
to influence corporate decisions in an ethnocentric multinational
company unless that co happens to be UK-based and dominated
by British trade union delegates. This is of critical significance in a
rapidly changing ‘branch plant’ economy where EWCs might be
perceived as offering an opportunity to challenge corporate
decision-making.
The North East of England
In the last three decades there has been a major economic
restructuring of in the North East Region with a dramatic reduction
in the size of traditional industries which have been replaced by
what has been termed a 'branch plant economy' (Beynon et al.,
1994; Pike, 2000). This is characterised by a range of multinational
companies (Stone, 1998) engaged in increasingly competitive
markets. The multinational companies that have replaced the
12
regional companies are often highly susceptible to shifts in global
competition in the markets they supply, making profitability critical
in investment decisions. The local State and regional development
agencies are acutely aware of this and have become highly
attuned to 'attracting mobile investment from national and
international sources' consolidating a 'branch plant economy'
(Pike, 2000). Thus, a growing proportion of inward investment in
the region is foreign based, making it one of the leading UK
locations for foreign direct investment (Stone 1998). The impact on
employment can be seen by the Regional growth in manufacturing
jobs of which 12 per cent were in overseas based companies in
1978 growing to 30 per cent by 1996 (Stone 1997).
For its part, the North East Region has been able to supply a
'skilled' but flexible workforce with financial incentives for new
entrants. Resident MNCs, for example Nissan, have also helped to
attract new entrants to the region as exemplifiers of success and in
Nissan's case as part of its supplier network. However, even an
‘established’ multinational company such as Nissan is not immune
from competitive bidding between plants in relation to new
investment as was the case in 2000 when the local workforce was
dependant on the new Micra model being located in the
Sunderland plant. As Pike (2000) has argued, the region now
'remains overtly dependent upon the power of a handful of multi-
national employers' which have considerably less commitment to
the places they inhabit than the workers they employ.
This pattern of development is given further complexity by the
organisational structure of multinational companies themselves. A
single parent company may be involved in a complex set of
relationships which includes joint ventures, franchises and the
ownership of subsidiaries with varying degrees of financial
involvement. Furthermore, the company may have a divisional
structure and any number of different locations with quite different
functions such as head office, manufacturing sites and retail
outlets. This diversity has considerable implications for tracking
multinational companies as is clear from our North East database.
Nor is the problem simply an academic one; as we have argued
corporate structures have considerable implications for EWCs
themselves not least in relation to questions of ownership. In
particular, the Directives definition of ‘controlling undertaking’
which refers to ‘a dominant influence over another undertaking (the
controlled undertaking) by virtue, for example, of ownership,
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financial participation or the rules which govern it’ (Article 3.1. our
emphasis) still leaves room for considerable interpretation.
The North East Database
The foundation for the North East Regional database was provided
by the ETUI database that contains an inventory of MNCs and
their subsidiaries that are covered, or potentially covered, by the
Directive. These companies were tracked to the Region to identify
whether they were located there. Following the initial research
work on company coverage, lists of parent companies were sent to
trade unions at a national and regional level asking for assistance
to both identify companies covered by the Directive in the Northern
Region and provide EWC representatives details for the database.
The result of this has been that around 400 representatives have
been identified in the UK of which 49 are based in the North East
(Fitzgerald, Miller & Stirling 1999). Significantly it was not possible
to elicit comprehensive information from the regional offices of the
relevant trade unions since most trade union databases of EWC
delegates, where they exist, are held nationally. Similarly, building
a picture of delegate coverage in the region in some cases has
depended on existing contacts that the research team had
generated with representatives.
The continuing challenge for the database has been the increasing
complexity of company ownership and the rapidity of change.
Mapping-out the changing corporate environment of closures,
downsizing, mergers and acquisitions is an even more complex
task given that many of the available sources of information
detailing ownership are inevitably out-of-date. In this sense a
database is only a snap shot of a passing reality rather than an
organic living entity, a common predicament for many company
databases. However, the database provides a valuable tool for
beginning to understand the importance of the Directive for the
North East. The database identified a total of 220 MNCs with a
‘base’ in the region, which are covered by the terms of the
Directive. These control 416 subsidiaries of which just under 50%
are located in the Tyne and Wear area alone and, unsurprisingly,
almost 60 per cent of the companies are in manufacturing industry
with a further nineteen per cent in business and financial services.
Of the 220 multinational parents, 124 (controlling 266 subsidiaries)
have been identified as having an EWC agreement. The UK is the
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most common headquarters of the parents of Regional
subsidiaries but the majority are located overseas
We contacted each of the Regional European Works Council
representatives and of the data returned covering 25 parent
companies, 20 (80 per cent) were in manufacturing industry and
the rest in the service sector. Of this total, eight were UK owned;
six North American; two Norwegian and German; and one each
were Canadian, Dutch, Finnish, French, South Korean, Swedish
and Swiss. The manufacturing bias is large and typical of the
industrial structure of the Region but it is not substantially out of
step with other findings on sectoral distribution (Marginson et. al.
1998, p9). It also reflects the pattern of multinational investment in
the Region discussed above although there is a smaller
representation of Far Eastern multinationals than might be
anticipated. Of the representatives themselves, over 90 per cent
were trade union members, of which twelve were GMB; eight
AEEU; five GPMU; four TGWU; three UNISON; two each from the
CWU, ISTC and MSF; and one from UNIFI; four respondents were
non-union members. The empirical data was gathered using a two-
stage process in which 19 semi-structured interviews were
conducted and postal questionnaires sent to all European Works
Council representatives who were not interviewed (39 in total, of
which 24 were returned). This gave us a final sample of almost
three-quarters of the regional EWC members we were able to
identify who had either been interviewed or returned a
questionnaire.
The Research Outcomes
The key findings from the research in relation to the Regional
location of EWCs concerns the ability of employee works
councillors to represent the views of their constituents and to build
networks with the other delegates to the European Works Council.
We will also argue that the availability of training provides a crucial
support mechanism within which alliances can be built and
effective networks developed.
In our survey, two thirds (65 per cent) of the representatives had
been elected whilst the remaining third had been appointed.
However, there is little uniformity in systems of appointment and
election and there is a blurring of categories in relation to trade
union delegates who may be elected to shop stewards positions
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which become the basis for their participation in the EWC. The role
of the union in unionised companies was critical in the selection of
representatives, as one convenor said:
‘I just got a lot of mail through the front door one day saying you’re
the European Works Council rep for the UK and you have to
attend the meeting next Friday, (Dynamit Nobel)
A union official describes another scenario:
‘We allowed each country to decide how to nominate … in the UK
it worked out quite nicely but … in the end people could not come
up with names so it was left to ourselves and the TGWU’
The situation with non-unionised workers was graphically
illustrated at Scottish and Newcastle with a strongly unionised
manufacturing base and an extensive, and largely non-unionised
public house network. The unionised brewery workers used their
trade union structures to elect representatives along with a
minority of unionised pub staff. The non-union representatives
‘volunteered’ and felt they could represent nobody but themselves.
The ‘report-back system’ was clear for the brewery workers but
effectively non-existent for those in the public houses. The
company’s decision to disinvest in leisure and focus on brewing
has brought new European delegates into the European Works
Council and further illustrates the earlier point concerning their
dynamic nature.
In terms of representation, 24 delegates only represented their
own plant, four represented plants other than their own in the
region, two delegates represented their own plants and other
plants nationally, and 11 represented their own, regional and
national plants. Again, this representation is problematic given the
large number of subsidiaries companies we identified as part of
multinational groups. Thirty of the 43 also ‘reported back’ to those
they represented. Some used more that one method and seven
different strategies were noted including branch meetings and
shop stewards' committees that were confined to trade union
organisations. Of the others, workplace meetings and the use of
newsletters were the most significant. The interviews suggested a
wide range of communication techniques.
We found that effective systems of communication both between
EWC delegates and between delegates and their constituents was
developing rapidly. Twenty-seven of the 43 respondents had
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established communications with the other UK representatives
outside of meetings; 26 communicated with their European
counterparts outside meetings and six said they had
communications with delegates from other EWCs. In half of the
EWCs communication was conducted on a regular basis, in two it
was issue based and in three networking had not developed.
Responses ranged from a total lack of involvement if not
bemusement in one case to a total self-immersion in the new
communications technologies and intensive language learning in
another. Effective communications are inhibited by language and
cultural differences (Fitzgerald & Stirling 2001) and training is
critical in providing a support mechanism for works council
representatives.
The European Works Council is likely to be a new and ‘dislocating’
experience for even the most experienced representatives.
Dealing with this without a support network is likely to provide
serious challenges that representatives will prefer to withdraw from
rather than seek to overcome. Such a situation requires a
systematic and collective approach to training that allows
representatives to acquire a new range of knowledge and skills in
a supportive context. At least five key areas will need to be
developed in a training agenda (Miller & Stirling 1999). Firstly,
there is the question of handling management information and
understanding financial data. This may be managed by ‘experts’
where they are involved in the European Works Council but they
may lack the specialist knowledge of a particular company and
they are no substitutes for delegates taking on this role for
themselves. Secondly, there is a need for training in
communications that focuses on the significance of networking for
the successful organisation of the employee members of the works
council. Related to this is the issue of language awareness and
language training. This training needs to be related to different
cultures which generates a fourth area for training in developing
knowledge of national industrial relations systems. Finally there is
the issue of building a European Works Council as a team in a
multicultural context.
In our case study of Scottish and Newcastle, training has become
a critical element in integrating and developing the European
Works Council. The first stage was to develop a training needs
analysis that identified the key training issues. These mainly
focussed on the need for new skill development and an
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understanding of their role on the company’s European Forum.
The second stage of training delivery coincided with a major
company restructuring which saw the sale of leisure activities in
the UK and abroad and the acquisition of further brewing assets.
At the time, the training was coincidentally restricted to UK
delegates and focused on seeking to make the Forum effective as
delegates felt it had little role in receiving information or being
consulted about the company changes. The third stage has now
been completed and has focussed on delegates acquiring the
skills that has allowed the UK full time union officials to withdraw
from their high profile involvement and to continue to develop
strategies to increase the effectiveness of the Forum. French and
Belgium brewing trade union delegates participated in this stage
and the training was managed in a multi-cultural context that was
able to focus on issues of isolation and joint working. It also
highlighted cultural differences in approaches to the European
Works Council and in terms of expectations about its role. This has
also provided a ‘culture shock’ to a UK management used to
delivering information at Forum meetings but little more and now
clearly failing to meet the expectations of the non-British
delegates. Training programmes such as this provide an essential
opportunity to overcome isolation and hostility which leaves EWCs
as little more than an assemblage of national delegations.
Conclusion
EWCs offer new possibilities for workers to make an input into
decision-making in large multinational companies. They emerged
through the development of political activity as a direct response to
the economic power of such companies challenging the role of the
national State. As such, they did not grow organically from the
perceived needs of companies to provide an additional layer to
their industrial relations structures. Nevertheless, the Directive
allowed for considerable scope for voluntary agreements once the
principle had been accepted. These circumstances led to the
development of EWCs that inevitably drew on national models as
frameworks for their own organisational structures and methods of
operating. However, whilst the influence of national industrial
relations systems has been acknowledged in academic argument
the role of corporate structures and decision-making processes
has been relatively neglected by comparison. In reality, corporate
organisation is critical to understanding how EWCs operate and
whether they are able to fulfil the expectations of participants. This
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is particularly the case where employee representatives are
isolated geographically from other plants and from corporate
decisions that directly affect their futures. Workers in a branch
plant economy can be on the margins of company strategy and
European Works Council activity.
In this paper we have sought to develop a two-fold model of
corporate strategy and its relationship with EWCs that illustrates
our central argument that the successful fulfilment of expectations
in relation to the European Works Council will depend on the
nature of the multinational company itself. In this respect, workers
on the periphery of an ethnocentric corporation with a diverse
product market and little integration may share little in common
with other works council representatives. In those organisations
there is a considerable challenge in defining a role for the
European Works Council and creating the sort of teambuilding
necessary for the development of an integrated works council
operating at the European level.
By contrast, workers that are geographically isolated may be
economically integrated in terms of an integrated, geocentric
business. In those cases EWCs may have a critical role to play in
corporate industrial relations and offer opportunities for the
effective development of the works council’s role. In such
circumstances, European Works Councillors from a geographically
isolated region such as the North East of England may be able to
play a critical role in working with others to influence corporate
decision-making.
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